I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently.
The basic thesis of evidential problem of evil is that because there is probably so much pointless evil in the world, it is rational to think that God does not exist. More specifically, I will argue that it is more pragmatically rational to believe there is probably pointless evil than to believe every evil has a point, given the epistemic gap between human and the divine. Secondly, several things to take note. There are 2 kinds of evil or suffering. A pointed suffering and a pointless suffering.
An argument from nonbelief is a philosophical argument that asserts an inconsistency between the existence of God and a world in which people fail to recognize him. It is similar to the classic argument from evil in affirming an inconsistency between the world that exists and the world that would exist if God had certain desires combined with the power to see them through. There are two key varieties of the argument. The argument from reasonable nonbelief or the argument from divine hiddenness was first elaborated in J. Schellenberg 's book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason.